Outbound and Inbound Network Security for Clockspring

Most Clockspring deployments are on-prem. That means firewalls and network boundaries matter, especially when integrating with external systems.

This article explains what to consider for both outbound and inbound connectivity without diving into processor-level configuration.

Outbound Network Access (Most Common)

Most integrations require Clockspring to initiate outbound connections.

Examples:

• Calling external APIs

• Pushing data to SaaS platforms

• Downloading files

Things to confirm early

• Which hosts and ports must be reachable

• Whether outbound traffic is restricted

• Whether a proxy is required

• Whether TLS inspection is in place

A flow that works in dev but fails in prod is often blocked by outbound firewall rules.

Proxies and Restricted Networks

In locked-down environments:

• Direct outbound access may be blocked

• HTTPS may be intercepted or inspected

• Proxies may be mandatory

Plan for:

• Explicit proxy configuration

• Certificate trust changes due to inspection

• Different behavior between environments

Do not assume outbound HTTPS is allowed.

Inbound Connectivity Is a Different Problem

Inbound integrations introduce more risk and complexity.

Examples:

• External services pushing data into Clockspring

• Webhooks

• Partner callbacks

This requires deliberate design. Simply opening ports is rarely acceptable.

Recommended Pattern for Inbound Data on Prem

The most common and safest approach:

1. Place a Clockspring node in the DMZ

• Dedicated to receiving inbound traffic

• Limited scope and permissions

• Ideally protected with mTLS

This node does not run your full internal flows.

2. Terminate inbound traffic securely

Options include:

• mTLS for strong authentication

• IP allowlists

• Narrow, purpose-built endpoints

Avoid anonymous inbound endpoints whenever possible.

3. Hand off data to the internal environment

The DMZ node should pass data inward using controlled mechanisms, such as:

• Writing to a database

• Dropping files to object storage (e.g., S3-compatible)

• Writing to a message queue

Internal Clockspring nodes then pull the data rather than accepting inbound connections.

Why This Pattern Works

• Reduces attack surface

• Keeps internal nodes off the public edge

• Aligns with common enterprise security models

• Makes firewall rules explicit and auditable

This is almost always easier to get approved by security teams.

Things to Decide Up Front

Before building inbound flows, answer:

• Who initiates the connection

• Where termination happens

• How data crosses security zones

• How authentication is enforced

• How failures are handled

These decisions are architectural, not processor-specific.

Summary

For on-prem Clockspring deployments:

• Outbound access must be planned and approved

• Inbound access requires deliberate security design

• A DMZ ingestion node with secure handoff is the recommended pattern

Think about network boundaries early. Retrofitting firewall rules later is painful.